Abstract. If several physical theories are consistent with the same experimental data, which theory should we choose? Physicists often choose the simplest theory; this principle (explicitly formulated by Occam) is one of the basic principles of physical reasoning. However, until recently, this principle was mainly a heuristic because it uses the informal notion of simplicity.
Simplicity can now be de ned formally. Now, with the advent of Algorithmic Information Theory (see, e.g., 16]), there are formal (and well-accepted) de nitions of simplicity. The rst such de nition was proposed, in mid-60s, practically simultaneously, by A. Kolmogorov, R. Solomono , and G. Chaitin; this notion is called Kolmogorov complexity. Crudely speaking, Kolmogorov complexity of a text is the shortest length of a program (in some universal language) that generates this text. There are also several modi cations of this de nition. For di erent problems, di erent formalizations turn out to be more adequate.
This formalization leads to the following two (natural and related) questions:
? First, which of the de nitions of simplicity is more adequate for choosing a physical theory?
? Second, now that the idea of choosing the simplest theory becomes formal, the question is: is this principle mathematical or physical? In other words: does this formal principle follow from the traditional principles of mathematical statistics (that are used to process physical data), or is this principle independent from the general principles of mathematical statistics, and somehow re ecting the speci c structure of our physical world (as opposed to other mathematically possible \worlds")?
What we are planning to do. In Section 2, we describe the result by Li and Vit anyi (which is, in its turn, based on Levin's theorem) that the basic principles of mathematical statistics do indeed lead to a formalization of the principle of choosing the simplest theory, and we explicitly describe the formalization of complexity that this theory corresponds to. Thus, we get answers to both questions. The main ideas of our exposition are from Li and Vit anyi 16]. However, since our main goal is formalizing this principle with respect to physical theories, our exposition will be speci cally oriented towards the physics readers and therefore, our formulation and our exposition will be somewhat di erent from 16] . In particular, we will give physical motivations for all de nitions and requirements that are used in the proof. In Section 3, we show that the resulting formalization is consistent with the traditional use of this principle in theoretical physics. Hopes and speculations are described in the nal Section 4.
2. Justi cation of the principle of choosing the simplest physical theory Basic statistical approach: brief reminder. According to the fundamentals of mathematical statistics, in order to choose a theory based on the experimental data, we must do the following:
? nd the prior probabilities P 0 (H i ) of di erent hypotheses H i ; ? use the experimental data E to compute the posterior probabilities P(H i ) of di erent hypotheses; to compute these probabilities, we can use the Bayes rule P(H i ) = P(EjH i ) P 0 (H i )
where P(EjH) is the probability of observing the data E in case the hypothesis H is true;
? and, nally, select a hypothesis whose probability is the largest P(H i ) ! max.
The posterior probability P(H i ) of a hypothesis H i is also called its likelihood, and correspondingly, the above basic statistical approach is also called the maximum likelihood (ML) approach. From the computational viewpoint, it is often convenient to use negative logarithms ? log(P(H i )) of the probabilities: e.g., for the most widely used Gaussian distribution, the probabilities exp(?c x 2 ) require calling an exponential function and are, therefore, much more di cult to compute than their negative logarithms ?c x 2 . Since negative logarithm is a decreasing function, in terms of negative logarithms, the criterion P(H i ) ! max takes the form ? log(P(H i )) ! min.
At rst glance, this approach may sound somewhat subjective because the resulting choice of a hypothesis depends on the original (rather subjective) choice of prior probabilities. However, it is known that in the long run (as we get more and more experimental data), this dependence disappears. To be more precise, let us assume that the actual theory is H a . Then:
? If the prior probability of H a is 0 (i.e., P 0 (H a ) = 0), then no matter how many experimental data we get, if we apply the above Bayes formula, we always end up with P(H a ) = 0.
? However, if we make sure that the prior probability of the correct hypothesis is positive (P 0 (H 0 ) > 0), then, as the number of experimental data increases, the probability P(H a ) of this hypothesis will increase, while the probabilities of other hypotheses will decrease and eventually, we will get P(H a ) P (H i ) for all H i 6 = H a and therefore, eventually, the hypothesis H a will be chosen.
Since we do not know which hypothesis is correct, we must require that an prior probability of each hypothesis is positive.
This mathematically sounding result is actually very intuitively clear: if we do not know which of the hypotheses is true, we must not throw away any of them, otherwise, we may throw away the only theory that is consistent with the observations. How to apply this general approach to fundamental physics ( rst approximation). One of the major goals of physics is to predict the results of di erent experiments. Whatever mathematical language a theory or hypothesis is formulated in, eventually, we are interested in what observation results this theory predicts. These results can also be described in di erent terms, but since most measurements and practically all data processing is done by using computers, we can use the fact that inside the computers, everything is represented by 0's and 1's. Each 0 or 1 is called a binary unit, or, for short, a bit. Therefore, for simplicity of analysis (and without losing any generality), we can assume that all possible experimental results form a (potentially in nite) binary sequence X = x 1 x 2 : : :x n : : :
Our goal is to predict either the results of all the experiments, or at least the results of some of them. So, our goal is to predict either the entire (potentially in nite) sequence X, or a nite portion of this sequence. Therefore, to apply the standard statistical methodology, we need a prior measure on the set of all such sequences.
To describe this measure, it is su cient to describe, for each nite sequence x = x 1 : : :x n , the probability p(x) that the (possible in nite) sequence X of measurement results will start with x. These probabilities must satisfy the two natural requirements:
? Since every sequence starting with x must continue either with 0, or with 1, we get the additivity condition for probabilities: p(x) = p(x0) + p(x1).
? Also, the total probability must be equal to 1, i.e., p(0) + p(1) = 1.
The second requirement can be formulated as a particular case of the additivity requirement, if we allow an empty string x = and assume that p( ) = 1 (1):
Comment. In the following text, we will see that we need to make a (minor) modi cation to these formulas; that is why we called this description the rst approximation.
The prior probabilities must be computable (in some reasonable sense).
The above-described statistical methodology requires us to compute the posterior probabilities based on the prior ones. Bayes' formula is explicit, but in order to use it, we must assume that the prior probabilities P 0 (H) are, in some reasonable sense, computable. What does this \computable" mean? Crudely speaking, a prior probability of an event means the probability of this event that is computed based on some a priori ideas, i.e., probabilities computed based on some prior \theory".
If an event is simple enough, then, in this prior \theory", we can simply compute its probability directly. To be more precise, we can compute this probability with an arbitrary accuracy, i.e., there exists an algorithm that, given a positive integer k, computes a rational number r k that is 10 ?k -close to the desired probability p (i.e., for which jr k ?pj 10 ?k ). Real numbers p for which such an algorithmic approximation is possible are called computable. If we have an algorithm that, given x and k, returns a 10 ?k -approximation to p(x), then p(x) is called a computable function.
Often, however, the desired event can have many di erent reasons; it is possible to compute the probabilities related to each reason but it is di cult to compute the total probability. This e ect is well known to experimental physicists who estimate the reliability of their experimental results (i.e., the probability that the observed results are caused not by the analyzed phenomena, but rather by noise). There are well-known examples when experimental claims, that were initially thought to be correct, later on turned out to be false because of some additional factors: e.g., Weber's experimental discovery of gravitational waves turned out to be an observation of a di erent phenomenon 17].
If we take this feature of experimental physics into consideration, we will arrive at the conclusion that for each nite sequence x, the desired probability p(x) is not necessarily a computable real number, but that it is the limit p(x) = limp N (x); where p N (x) is the probability that only takes rst N factors into consideration.
The sequence fp N (x)g is:
? non-decreasing in the sense that p 1 (x) p 2 (x) : : :
: : :, and
? computable in the sense that there is an algorithm that, for every x, N, and k, returns a 10 ?k -approximation to p N (x). Functions that can be represented as limits of non-decreasing computable sequences are called enumerable (crudely speaking, this name comes from the fact that after we enumerate all factors, we get the desired probabilities). Thus, we can re-formulate the requirement on the function p(x) by saying that p should be an enumerable function.
How to distinguish a reasonable prior probability measure from other possible probability measures. When choosing prior probabilities p 0 (x), the main requirement is not to assign probability 0 to an event E that could end up with a non-zero probability if we use a di erent prior probability measure p(x). In particular, if, as the event E, we take the statement that X must start with a given nite sequence x, this requirement means that we must avoid the situations when p 0 (x)=p(x) = 0, i.e., we must require that p 0 (x)=p(x) > 0 for all words x.
Events E can be more complicated than that; for example, we may have events that are de ned as limits of the above simple events. To cover all possible more complicated events, it is reasonable to require that not only all the ratios p 0 (x)=p(x) be positive, but that also the limits p 0 (x (N ) )=p(x (N ) ) of such ratios, corresponding to di erent sequences x (N ) , should also be always positive. In mathematical terms, this requirement can be formulated as follows: we have a set S of all possible values of the ratio p 0 (x)=p(x), and we require that if a sequence of real numbers from this set S has a limit, then this limit should be positive. For an arbitrary set S of real numbers, the smallest possible limit of sequences from S is known to be equal to the in mum inf(S) of this set S (i.e., to its greatest lower bound (g.l.b.)). Thus, the requirement that all the limits are positive is equivalent to requiring that the smallest of these limits is positive, i.e., that inf(p 0 (x)=p(x)) > 0. This, in turn, means that there exists a positive number c > 0 for which, for all x, p 0 (x) c p(x).
Thus, we can say that an enumerable probability measure p 0 (x) is an ideal prior measure if for every other enumerable probability measure p(x), there exists a constant c > 0 for which p 0 (x) c p(x) for all x.
Modi cation is needed. The above idea of an \ideal" prior probability measure was proposed, in the early 60s, by R. Solomono , one of the authors of Algorithmic Information Theory. However, Solomono himself showed that, in e ect, the seemingly reasonable formalization of this idea (the one we have just described) does not work, in the sense that the above-de ned \ideal" prior measure cannot exist (for detailed and precise history, see 16]).
In view of this impossibility, we must modify our de nitions. Such a modication has actually been proposed. The modi cation, as well see in a second, is very natural from the computer science viewpoint (and from the common sense viewpoint as well).
Final de nitions. The prior probability p(x) can be obtained, e.g., if we poll several experts and take, as p(x), the fraction N(x)=N between the total number N(x) of experts who believe that x will occur in the measurement, and the total number N of experts. If every expert is a priori de nite in his beliefs, i.e., if he believes, for every word x, either that x will occur, or that x will not occur, then the resulting values p(x) indeed form a probability measure: e.g., among all the experts who believe in x = x 1 : : :x n , some believe in x0 = x 1 : : :x n 0 and some in x1 = x 1 : : :x n 1 (but everyone does believe in one of these two), and therefore, N(x) = N(x0) + N(x1) and p(x) = p(x0) + p(x1).
In reality, however, experts may be undecided about some measurement results. So, among N(x) experts who initially believe in x, some will believe in x0, some in x1, while some will be undecided about what will follow x. In databases and in other areas of computer science, the case when we do not know a certain value is called a wild card and is denoted by . Thus, we can express the situation in which an expert has no opinion about the continuation of x by x , and conclude that N(x) = N(x0) + N(x1) + N(x ) and therefore, p(x) = p(x0) + p(x1) + p(x ).
We are interested only in the probabilities p(x) of de nite sequences (i.e., sequences that contain only 0's and 1's but not the wild card ). For these values, the above complicated additivity requirement turns into an inequality:
p(x) p(x0) + p(x1): (2) It is known that other methods of soliciting the degree of belief (e.g., methods that take into consideration not only how voted for and who against, but also to what extent each expert believes in x) also lead to numerical measures that satisfy the inequality (2).
Thus, instead of probability measures, we must consider functions p that maps nite binary strings into real numbers and that satisfy the properties (1) and (2) . In Algorithmic Information theory, such functions are called semi-measures.
Main results. Using the same arguments as above, we conclude that it is reasonable to require:
? that the function p(x) is enumerable, and ? that the ideal prior semi-measure p 0 (x) must be such that for any other enumerable semi-measure p(x), there exists a constant c > 0 for which for all x, p 0 (x) c p(x). For thus modi ed de nition (with probability measure replaced by semi-measure), it is already possible to prove that the ideal prior semi-measure exists (and that it is, in some reasonable sense, unique; this theorem was rst proven by L. Levin; see 16] for a detailed history). The resulting ideal prior semi-measure is usually denoted by M(x).
Thus, according to the statistical methodology, we must choose, for each n, the sequence x = x 1 : : :x n for which M(x) ! max, or, equivalently, for which KM(x) ! min, where we denoted KM(x) = ? log 2 (M(x)).
It turns out that this negative binary logarithm KM(x) = ? log 2 (M(x)) is closely related to one of the versions of Kolmogorov complexity: namely, to the monotone complexity Km(x) that is de ned (crudely speaking) as the length of the shortest program that computes a sequence x or a sequence that starts with x on a universal monotone Turing machine (i.e., on a computer with a one-way read-only input tape, a one-way write-only output tape (and some work tapes). The close relationship between Km(x) and KM(x) is described, e.g., by the following two properties:
? KM(x) Km(x) KM(x) + Km(KM(x)) + O(1); ? for almost all in nite sequences X = x 1 : : :x n : : :, the di erence between Km(x 1 : : :x n ) and KM(x 1 : : :x n ) grows slower than any unbounded computable function. Due to this close relationship, the negative logarithm KM(x) of a universal semimeasure is also considered one of the versions of Kolmogorov complexity.
Conclusion. From the basis statistical methodology, we can deduce that, if there are several physical theories consistent with the known experimental data, we must always choose the simplest theory x, i.e., a theory for which KM(x) ! min, where KM(x) is the above formalization of complexity. Historical comment. This derivation was rst proposed by M. Li and P. Vit'anyi; see 14{16,26,27].
Why is this particular formalization of Kolmogorov complexity the most adequate for choosing a theory? Physical explanation. Let us give a physical explanation of why not the original Kolmogorov complexity, but its monotone version turned out to be more adequate for choosing physical theories. Indeed, the main di erence between Km(x) and the original Kolmogorov complexity C(x) is that:
? in the de nition of original Kolmogorov complexity, we only consider programs that produce exactly x, while ? in the de nition of Km(x), we also consider programs whose output contains x followed by something else. This di erence has a simple physical interpretation: In physics, often, when we want to predict a certain value of the eld at some speci c moment of time, a natural way is:
? to nd a general solution of the corresponding system of partial di erential equation, and then ? to extract the desired values from the general solution (this \general" solution is, frequently, only applicable to a certain area, e.g., a vacuum electromagnetic eld solution only holds outside the bodies). The resulting algorithm consists of two parts:
? solving the system of equations, and ? extracting the desired values from the general solution.
From the viewpoint of the original Kolmogorov complexity, we have to count the complexity of both parts when we estimate the complexity of the solution. The complexity of the rst part is indeed indicative of the complexity of the physical world, while the complexity of the second part (extraction) has nothing to do with the physical world and is caused solely by the fact that we are not currently interested in all the solution, only in the part of it. Therefore, if we are interested in characterizing the physical world itself (and not in our own goals), we should neglect the complexity of the second (extraction) part. This is exactly what Km(x) is doing.
This idea has been successfully used in many applications. In the above derivation, we did not use many speci cs of physics as opposed to data processing in general. It will, therefore, not be a surprise to a reader to know that this idea (of choosing the hypothesis for which some version of Kolmogorov complexity takes the smallest possible value) has been originally proposed and successfully used in data processing. Namely, it was rst described, under the name of the minimum description length principle, by J. J. Rissanen in 20] ; for a more recent modi cations and updates, see, e.g., 16, 21, 22] . This idea has been applied to various areas such as handwriting recognition 9], surface reconstruction in computer vision 19], economic forecasts 11], cognitive psychology 2], biology, etc. 16]. These successes make us believe that this formalized principle will be useful in fundamental physics as well.
Qualitative physical examples

MAIN IDEA BEHIND THE EXAMPLES
Our intention. In this section, we will show that, on the qualitative level, most fundamental ideas of physics can be re-formulated as natural steps towards choosing a theory that is the simplest in the above precise sense.
Is this intention consistent with our intuition? At rst glance, this claim may seem counter-intuitive, because the advance of physics usually means going to more and more complicated theories. For example:
? a simple pre-physical theory that everything in this world is determined by the good and evil spirits and is, therefore, completely unpredictable, a theory that uses no mathematics at all, seems to be very simple, ? while Newtonian mechanics, a theory that uses complicated di erential equations, seems to be much more complicated. This seeming contradiction with the intuition only comes from the fact that the word \simple" is very ambiguous. If we use the word \simple" in the precise way indicated in the previous section, then Newtonian mechanics is no longer simpler that the belief in a completely unpredictable world. Indeed, according to this de nition, a complexity of a theory is, crudely speaking, the smallest length of the program that is able to predict (according to this theory) the results of all possible observations and measurements.
? By the intuitive understanding of a completely unpredictable world, the only way for a program to predict all the measured values is to actually store them. (If we would be able to store some of these values and predict the others, the theory would not be completely unpredictable.) Thus, within this theory, we must store all the values to predict them. The complexity of this theory is (in the formal sense described in the previous section) the largest possible.
? On the other hand, in Newtonian mechanics, e.g., for particles, we only need to know the positions and velocities of all the particles in the initial moment of time t 0 ; then we will be able, by integrating the equations of motion, to predict the values at all other moments of time. Thus: instead of storing the values of the particles' coordinates and velocities at all possible moments of time, it is su cient to store these values only for a single moment of time. Thus, when we go from a lawless world to a world described by Newtonian mechanics, we get a drastic decrease in the (formally understood) complexity. Comment. The idea that progress in physics actually leads to theories that are simpler in some reasonable sense was emphasized and advocated by Einstein; e.g., he wrote that as \our experience grows larger and larger ... the simpler the logical structure hof the physical theoryi becomes { that is to say, the smaller the number of logically independent conceptual elements which are found necessary to support the structure" ( 3] , p. 273).
How to minimize the complexity: a general idea. One of the major goals of a physical theory is to describe what is happening everywhere in the Universe. In other words, we must describe the values of all possible physical quantities in di erent points of space at di erent moments of time.
In the above-mentioned hypothetical completely unpredictable and lawless world, to describe all these values, we would actually need to describe the value of each quantity at each point of space-time. (Since all these values are unlimited and unrelated, if we miss one of these values, we will not be able to reconstruct it from the other stored ones, and therefore, if we want to be able to reconstruct the state of the Universe, we must actually store all the values.) In other words, the Kolmogorov complexity of this description is equal to the total length of all the values stored. How can we decrease the complexity of this description?
In order to answer this question, let us estimate how many bits we need to store the complete information about the lawless world. By using b bits, we can store V = 2 b possible values. Therefore, if a certain physical quantity has V possible values, we must use log 2 (V ) bits to store its value. Therefore, if we have T moments of time, S points in space, if we have the total number Q of measurable quantities, and if we have V possible values of each quantity, we need to store T S Q di erent values, each of which requires log 2 (V ) bits. Therefore, totally, we need B = T S Q log 2 (V ) bits to store all this information. (If one of these numbers is in nite, then, of course, we must store in nitely many bits.)
From the purely mathematical viewpoint, to decrease the complexity B of this description, we must, therefore, do one (or several) of the following things:
? decrease the number T of moments of time; ? decrease the number S of possible points in space; ? decrease the number Q of possible quantities; ? decrease the number V of possible values of each quantity, and ? introduce dependency between:
values of di erent quantities, values at di erent moments of time, and/or in di erent spatial points. Restricting T: Big Bang. Restricting the \number of di erent moments of time" means, in e ect, restricting the lifetime of the Universe. Thus, we naturally arrive at the idea of a Universe that has the beginning.
Restricting S: atomism. Similarly, restricting the \number of di erent spatial points" means that, according to our theory, most of the spatial points inside the Universe have no objects in them, and the matter is concentrated in a few places while others are lled with vacuum. Thus, we get the idea of atomism.
Restricting Q: uncertainty principle. Since the total number of possible physical quantities is given, the only way to restrict the total number of measured quantities is to impose restriction according to which measuring one of the properties restricts or even prohibits the measurement of the other quantities.
Restricting V : Special Relativity Theory, quark con nement, quantization. Similarly to the above two methods of decreasing the total number S of spatial points, there are two ways to decrease the total number of possible values V of a physical quantity:
? First, we can bound the possible values of this quantity.
The best known example of such bounding is the bounding of possible velocities which is the basis of special relativity. Another example, also well known but much less fundamental, is the restriction on the relative location of two quarks known as quark connement (see, e.g., 28]).
? Second, we can assume that not all values within the bound are possible, but only some of these values. This is the original fundamental idea of quantization: in quantum mechanics, many quantities can also take values from a certain discrete set (spectrum If we do not have a complete relations between di erent elds, we can at least get some relation, e.g., in terms of equality of some numerical characteristics corresponding to di erent elds. Such equalities have been discovered since Dirac, in 1937, rst observed that the ratio between the electromagnetic and gravitational forces between, say, two protons ( 10 40 ), is almost equal to the ratio of the Universe's size and the time during which light passes through a proton. This equality is not very easy to explain within speci c theories of modern physics (see detailed discussion in 17]), but it is quite in line with our general principle of choosing the simplest theory.
Speculations and hopes
In this paper, we have shown two things:
? First, we have described, for a physics reader, how the principle of choosing the simplest physical theory, the idea that is usually formulated in informal, qualitative terms, can be reformulated in precise, quantitative terms; this formalization has been successfully used in various areas of data processing.
? Second, we have shown that this formalization explains, on the qualitative level, many fundamental principles of physics.
The success of formalizing the principle itself makes us hope that it may be possible to formalize these explanations as well, and thus, come out with a new universal physical theory in which the choice of the simplest hypothesis (or, equivalently, algorithmic information theory) is the sole axiom.
This possibility is in good accordance with the vision of Einstein who said ( 3] , p. 274) that \Our experience hitherto justi es us in believing that nature is the realization of the simplest conceivable mathematical ideas."
This hope of ours, that physics may be eventually reduced to algorithmic information theory, is also in clear agreement with the physically motivated ideas of J. A. Wheeler of logic as pre-geometry and pre-physics (see, e.g., 17] and references therein).
